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In the SupreJDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
JESS JIMENEZ, 
vs. 
Ptaimtiff and 
Respondent, 
RAY O'BRIEN and BOYD BYRON 
BROADWATER, 
Defendant's and 
Avpellamts. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Case No. 
7264 
The Statement of Facts contained in the brief of 
Appellant is not complete and does. not fairly present to 
the court the complete factual picture. We, therefore, 
desire to supplement the statement of the Appellant with 
the following additional facts: 
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The accident in which the Appel~ant was injured 
occurred on July 9, 1945. Appellant was first taken to 
the Salt Lake General Hospital and within a few hours 
was removed to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
Jimenez was treated by Dr. Stewart A. Wright, a Neuro-
Surgeon. (R. 245). At the time Dr. Wright first ex-
amined Jimenez, which was on the day of the accident, 
Jimenez was unconscious. (R. 245). Mr. Jimenez's in-
jury was diagnozed as ''a brain contusion severe in 
type.'' (R. 246). Jimenez remained unconscious for a 
period of from two to two and one half weeks. The 
length of his period of unconsciousness is indicative of 
the severity of the injury which he sustained. (R. 248). 
Although Jimenez gradually improved after the 
eighth or tenth day, he was not fuNy recoverd when he 
left the hospital on August 14th. It was the opinion of 
Dr. Wright that Jimenez had sustained a permanent 
brain injury. The basis of this opinion was that Jimenez 
remained unconscious from two to two and one half 
weeks. Dr. Wright explained that nerve cells of the 
brain were destroyed and when a certain part of them 
are destroyed, they are not replaced by others and ''scar 
tissue forms; that the nerve cells which carry on the 
primary function of the brain do not re-generate or re-
produce." (R. 250-251). As to the a'bility of Jimenez 
to reason on August 14, 1945, Dr. Wright testified that 
he did not think the man was able to reason normally; 
that if he had been able to reason normally he would not 
have over-ridden the Doctor's objection to his leaving 
the hospital after a severe brain injury. (R. 136). 
\ 
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)[rs. Loy, a friend of Jiinenez, testified that after 
Jimenez was taken to St. :J[ark's Hospital, it was be-
tween two and three weeks before he knew anybody or 
could recog-nize anyone. ( R. 266). She further testified 
that after Jin1enez regained consciousness, sometimes 
he was Yery rational and recognized his friends and at 
other times he would not recognize his friends and would 
not recall their having visited him. During these irra-
tional periods, Jimenez would accuse his friends of hav-
ing neglected him even though they might have visited 
him earlier on the same day. (R. 226). 
Physical appearance of Jimenez was had and he had 
a hard time talking, stammering and stuttering. (R. 
227). On several occasions he told Mrs. Loy that he 
had a gun under his bed and had shot some pigeons. He 
told her to take the pigeons home. He also thought that 
the doctor and the hospital were trying to run his bill 
up to make more money. He wasn't even able to feed 
himself, but he still thought he was well and should go 
home. 
After Jimenez was out of the hospital and while he 
was still a sick man, he insisted on calling on Mrs. Loy, 
i.nstead of remaining home in bed. His appearance and 
manner were considerably changed. His dress was un-
tidy and he was generally unkempt, whereas, prior to 
the injury he had been neat in his dress and appearance. 
He had bought three copies of the same issue of a maga-
zine and he bought clothes which were far too small for 
him to wear. (R. 230). 
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After he was out of the hospital, Jimenez was unable 
to walk in a normal manner; walking in a stagger, similar 
to that of a drunken person. His nerves were badly 
frayed and he could not stand noises of any sort. He 
was depressed, changeable and moody. Fr·equently he 
changed his plans between going away to a distant state 
and remaining in Salt Lake City. (H. 231). ·The same 
changeability was manifested in Jimenez's opinion of his 
children. On one day he would think them complete1y 
had and on the next day would think them the most 
wonderful children in the world. He was also very emo-
tional at thi~ time and easily provoked to weeping and 
crying, and his memory was very bad after the accident, 
as compared to what it had been before. 
Dr. Garland H. Pace, a physician specializing in 
Neurology and Psychiatry testified that Jimenez suf-
fered a permanent brain damage from his accident and 
per1nanent damage to his personality structure. 
We also invite the court's attention to the fact that 
Jimenez signed both of the releas-es, that is, the release 
of August 14, 1'94!5 and that of September 5, 1945, Ex-
hibit Numbers 5 and 6, as "Gimenez." In other words, 
Jimenez did not ·even correctly spe1l his own name on 
the day he signed the releases. 
We also invite the court to compare the handwrit-
ing of Jimenez on the releases with his handwriting on 
Exhibit H, which is a sample of his handwriting taken 
in the court at the time of trial. Although counsel stipu-
lated in open court that the signatures on the releases 
were those of Jimenez, Jimenez himself did not think he 
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signed the last name of the signature Ly remwn of the 
mis-spelling thereof. (R. 230). He had no recollection 
of writing the words in his handwriting on the release 
form. 
Jimenez could not even re1nen1ber whether l\Irs. 
Gounis, his ex-wife, 'vas with him at the time the second 
re1ease was executed. (R. 335.) Jimenez further testi-
fied that he did not recall ever having s·een :Mr. Ben 
Duncan while he was at the hospital, although :Mr. Dun-
can had visited him numerous times and had procured his 
signature on the releases. Jimenez did remember the 
name, but not the person. Jimenez had no recollection 
of any conversations with Duncan but he did recall sign-
ing a paper but wasn't sure what it was. (R. 340). Jim-
enez had no recollection of a transcribed statement by 
him which was taken in question and answer form by 
Mrs. Pannier, shorthand reporter. (R. 34;5). 
We also invite the court's attention to the fact that 
almost from the very date of injury, Ben Duncan, the 
insurance adjuster for the Farmers Inter-Insurance Ex-
change ''camped'' on the trail of Jimenez. The first 
time he called at the hospital was on July 13th, four 
days after the accident. The plaintiff, Jimenez, was 
under the influence of sedatives and incapable of carry-
ing on a conversation (R. 382). However, Duncan called 
again a few days later and continued to call until he final-
ly succeeded in obtaining from Jimenez a release, on 
August 14, 1'945, the date when Jimenez was released 
from the hospital. Al~ in all, Duncan made six or seven 
visits. (R. 383). 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CROSS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The respondent cross assigns as error the following 
orders and rulings of the court: 
1. The court erred in sustaining the def·endant's 
objections to the following question to Dr. Stewart A. 
Wright, an expert medical witness: 
Q. "Doctor, do you have an opinion whether 
or not on August 14, 1945, Jess Jimenez had the 
Inental faculty or whether his mental faculties 
were so deficient or impaired that he did not 
have sufficient power to comprehend the sub-. 
ject of a contract, its nature, and its probable 
consequences, and to act with discretion with re-
lation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary 
affairs of life~" (R. 225). 
2. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's 
objection to the following hypothetical question to Dr. 
Pace, a n1edical expert: 
Q. ''All right, medicaHy unconscious for a 
period of two to two and a half weeks: that upon 
losing his status of being medically unconscious 
that he was unable to feed himself for a short 
period thereafter in ·excess of a week; that he 
was kept and was medicated with opiates during 
the period; assuming that the spinal fluid was 
tapped and showed the presence of blood in the 
spinal fluid; assuming . that he told his friends 
and relatives during the period of his conscious-
ness that he had a gun under his bed and asked 
them to take the pigeons he had killed home; 
assuming that he complained of pain in his head 
upon regaining consciousness; assuming that he 
evidenced a desire to 1eave the hospital and as-
suming also that contrary to his physician's ad-
vice and against his physician's wishes he did 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
leaYe the hospital on .August 14, 1~)45; assuming 
that after he left the hospital he was seen to walk 
in a manner indicative or comparable to the way 
a drunken man would walk; assuming he was 
upon occasion inclined to weep during the month 
immediately succeeding his release frmn the hos-
pital, and he complained of dizziness, lack of sleep, 
extreme fatigue, headaches; do you have an 
opinion as an expert in pyschiatry, that is Inedi-
cally sound, in your opi~ion, and based further 
upon your examination of the patient, as you haYe 
stated, as to whether or not on the 14th day of 
~\.ugust 1945, Jess Jimenez had the menta1 facul-
ties to be aware of the meaning of an act of sign-
ing a release on that date; do you have such an 
opinion 1'' 
3. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's 
objection to the hypothetical question to Dr. Pace, as 
follows: 
Q. ''Dr. Pace, I am going to ask you a hypo-
thetical question, and for the purpose of it I wish 
you to adopt certain facts as being true. Those 
facts are as follows: A'ssume, Doctor, that a male, 
age 38, did on the 6th day of July, 1945, suffer 
a ·brain contusion as a result of an automobile 
accident; that he was hospitalized for such in-
jury, and that the spinal fluid was tapped, show-
ing the presence of blood; assume that this male 
was unconscious for a period of from two to two 
and a half weeks during which time he was fed 
through the veins; as&ume after that period he 
regained consciousness and was medicated with 
opiates and sedatives, and that for approximately 
two weeks after gaining consciousness he could 
not feed himself; that during his period in the 
hospital, after he had re_gained consciousness, he 
to1d a friend that he had a gun under his bed and 
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had killed ·pigeons with it and during that period 
he remonstrated with the friend for not coming 
to see him, when the fact was that the friend had 
visited him daily; assume, doctor, that during the 
period that this male of the age of 38 was in the 
hospital and that on the 14th day of August; as-
sume, doctor, he did leave the hospital against the 
specific advice of his physician; assume further, 
doctor, that after he left the hospital and until 
the month of November, 1945, he was observed 
by a friend to waik with a stagger, to weep easily; 
that this 1nan complained of noise, dizziness and 
inability to sleep and easy and intense fatigue; 
that he presented an untidy appearance, and made 
purchases during this period of wearing apparel 
that obviously did not fit him; assume also, doc-
tor, that on the 14th day of August, 1945, whi1e 
still in the hospital he signed a release, given to 
an adjuster for an insurance company, the terms 
of which were to release the company, the person 
which that company insured from all liability for 
damages as a result of the accident and injury 
and that on September 15th of that year he exe-
cuted another release; 
THE COURT : September 5th: 
Q. September 5th. Assume that he received-
a consideration of one thousand dollars on the 
execution of the first release, plus the payment of 
his hospital and medical expenses to that date; 
assume that he received as a consideration for 
execution of the second release the nomina'l sum, 
less than fifty dollars. 
Do you have an opinion, doctor, which opinion 
is reasonably medically certain as to whether or 
not that person at the time he executed those 
releases had the mental faculty sufficient to un-
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derstand the nature and consequences of his 
acts.'' 
±. The court erred in sustaining the defendant's 
objection to that portion of the deposition of Dr. Rosen-
bloom, wherein he was asked to state whether or not 
on August 14, 19±5, Jimenez would have sufficient 1nental 
power to comprehend the subject of a contract and its 
nature and the probable consequences to his rights. (R. 
358-359). 
5. The court erred in excluding from evidence a 
portion from Page 15 of Dr. Rosenbloom's deposition. 
(R. 370-371). 
6. The court erred in excluding from evidence those 
matters offered by the plaintiff and contained in their 
offer of proof. (R. 439-441, inclusive). 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As pointed out in the Appellant's brief, there is no 
question in this case as to the liability of the defendant 
to the plaintiff. The only issues before the court and 
the only ones to which we shall address ourselves are 
those relating to the validity of the releases executed by 
the plaintiff on August 14th and September 5th, 1945, 
and as to whether the plaintiff was under an obligation 
to refund or tender to the defendant the amount he had 
received under his release before commencing this ac-
tion. We shall also treat briefly the question raised by 
our cross assignments of error, namely, whether the 
medical experts should have been permitted to give 
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their opinion as to the mental capacity of the plaintiff 
on the dates when the releases were executed. 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUFFI1CIENT EVIDENCE IN THE REC-
ORD TO JUSTIFY A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT 
ON AUGUST 14, 1945, AND ON SEPTEMBER 5, 
1945, THE DATES WHEN THE RELEASES WERE 
EXECUTED, THAT JIMENEZ LACKED SUFFI-
CIENT MENTAL CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND 
WHAT HE WAS DOING, AND WAS INCOMPETENT 
TO ENTER INTO A VALID AND BINDING AGREE-
MENT OF ANY SORT. 
We ~ave, under our statement of facts, detailed con-
siderable evidence omitted from Appellant's brief, re-
lating to the capacity of the p1aintiff at the time the re-
leases were executed. Although the court refused to per-
mit the various medical experts who were called by the 
plaintiff to give their expert opinions as to Jimenez's 
mental capacity on the dates when the releases were 
executed, we believe there is sufficient evidence, both 
n1edical and lay, to warrant a finding of incapacity on the 
part of Jimenez, at the time the releases were executed. 
'Ye have no quarrel with the rule of Anderson vs. O.S.L., 
47 Utah 614, 155 Pac. 446, cited and quoted in the appel-
lant's brief, Pages 11 and 12, to th'e effect that a settle-
ment agreement is binding on the parties and in the ab-
sence of fraud or concea1ment the release must not be 
set aside. However, that is only a general rule, and 
the release, like any other contract, is voidable if one 
of the parties thereto lacked contractual capacity at the 
time the release was executed. Nor do we have any dis-
pute with the rule stated in Hatch vs. Hatch, 148 Pac. 
433, 46 Utah 218, wherein it is said that: 
10 
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"In ordinary contracts the test is, were the 
mental faculties so deficient or hnpaired th&.t 
there was not sufficient power to c01nprehend 
the subject of the contract, its nature and its 
probable consequences, and to act with discre-
tion in relation thereto, or with relation to the 
ordinary affairs of life~'' 
That rule has since been followed in many sub-
sequent Utah cases. However, it is our contention that 
in this case, the evidence is sufficient to supp9rt a find-
ing of fact that the mental faculties of Jimenez were, at 
the time the releases were entered into, so deficient and 
impaired that he lacked the menta~ power to comprehend 
the subject matter of the contracts, their nature, and 
their probable consequences, and to act~th discretion in 
relation thereto or with relation to the ordinary affairs 
of life. In the leading case of Umion Pacific Railway_ 
Company vs. Barris, 1'58 U. S. 326, 39 L. Ed. 1003, it 
was held that where in an action for personal injuries 
the defendant sets up a written release of all claims for 
damages, signed by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, in 
denying its execution, sets up that it was signed by him 
in· ignorance of its contents at a time when he was 
under great suffering from his injuries and in a state ap-
proaching to unconsciousness caused by his injuries, the 
case is one for the jury under proper instructions from 
the court. 
As to whether the plaintiff had sufficient mental 
capacity at the time the release was ·entered into, in 
Kennedy vs. R~aby, (Olda.), 50 Pac. 2nd, 716, the court 
11 
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quoted with approval from St. Louis_and San Ftrfh'YIIcisco 
Railway Company vs. Reed, 37 Okla. 350, 132 Pac. 355, 
358 as follows: 
"Litigants who do not desire the good faith 
of their acts questioned should not use such un-
seemingly haste in their efforts to escape liability 
on account of admitted wrongful acts * * *." 
The court further said at page 710: 
''As was intimated in the Reed Case, supra, 
when litigants visit the bedside of an injured 
party in order to settle with her (him) before the 
surgical dressing has been removed, they should 
not be surprised when the courts permit their 
methods to be investigated. We therefore hold 
that the question of the validity of said release 
was properly submitted to the jury.'' 
In Jordom v. Guer11a, 23 Cal. 2d 469, 144 P. 2d 349, 
352, the court said : 
''It is the province of the jury to determine 
whether the circumstances furnished the oppor-
tunity for overreaching, whether the defendant or 
his agent took advantage of it, and whether the 
plaintiff was thereby misled. In reviewing the 
case the evidence must be regarded in the light 
most favorable to the jury's conclusion." 
Further, 
'' 'And in passing on the validity of such 
releas·e, when assailed, an surrounding conditions 
should be fully developed, and the relative atti-
tudes ·of the contracting parties clearly shown. 
So that the jury, in the clear light of the whole 
truth, may rightly decide which story bears the 
impress of verity'." 
12 
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It is interesting to note that the insurance company 
which was involved in the Guerra case is the srune one 
defending the case at bar. 
In the recent Idaho case of Estes v. Magee, 109 P. 
2d 631, the court said at page 635: 
"Conceding appellant is correct that to over-
throw the release the evidence 1nust be clear, 
satisfactory and convincing, this court has held 
that neverthe1ess the court, sitting without a jury 
as the trier of fact is the one to determine the 
weight of the evidence as coming up to such stand-
ard, if there is competent evidence to that effect.'' 
" 'The trial court is the appropriate tribunal 
to weight the evidence, and determine whether it 
is convincing and satisfactory, within the mean-
ing of the rule. It has been said that in such 
cases, as in others, the determination of that 
court in favor of either party upon conflicting or 
contradictory evidence is not open to review in 
the appellate court'." Wright v. Rosebaugh, Su-
pra, ( 46 Ida. 526, 2'69 Pac. 98) ('Sic). 0 'regan et 
al v. Henderson, 'Supra ( 46 Ida. 76!1, 27'1 Pac. 423) 
(Sic). Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Ida. 546, 551, 290 Pac. 
205, 207, 79 ALR 934. 
The rules above stated have been followed by the 
Utah Court. In McLaughlin v. Chief Cons~o;l. Mitwing Oo. 
et al., 62 Ut. 532, 220 Pac. 726, 733, the court said: 
"It is argued that the undisputed evidence 
shows conclusively that the release was valid in 
every way, and that no fraud was committed in 
its procurement. On this proposition the evi-
dence was conflicting. It is not for us to judge 
its weight nor to pass upon the credibility of wit-
nesses.'' 
13 
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And again: 
"The jury passed upon the conflicting evi-
dence, and, having by its verdict found in favor 
of plaintiff, that finding must be left undisturbed. 
\Vhen in a 'law case the evidence is conflicting and 
the court has denied a motion for new trial, the 
judgment must stand.'' 
The above statement of the rule was quoted with ap-
proval in Brown v. Union Padific Railroad Conv,pany, 
86 Ut. 475, 290 Pac. 759, and the court further said in 
that case: 
''The evidence in this case was conflicting. 
It was the duty of the court to submit the case to 
the jury. The jury saw and heard all the wit-
nesses and believed the plaintiff had been imposed 
on. The trial court, having seen and heard the 
witness·es, did not feel justified, although it had 
the power, to set aside the verdict because it was 
against the evidence. We, who have only read 
the record of the trial and proceedings, are asked 
to say that the jury and the trial judge did not 
do their duty. This we are unwilling to do. The 
appellant had a fair trial, and the trial court 
committed no errors. * * * The judgment must be 
sustained.'' 
The various cases cited by the appellant are not 
in conf!lict with the rules above quoted. We think no 
useful purpose can be suhserved by analyzing in detail 
the facts of thos·e cases. As ohserved by Mr. Justice 
Thurman in the case of Dovich v. Chief Consol}idated 
~711ining Compam;y, 53 Utah 522, 174 Pac. 627, 631, "Every 
case must be decided upon its own facts.'' It may 'be 
said generally that all of the cases cited by appellant are 
14 
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substantially different on their facts fron1 the case at 
bar, and in all of them, entirely different questions were 
involved. It may also be observed that in practicaNy all 
of those cases the person charged with mental incom-
petence was a person of advanced years, suffering from 
some degree of senility, and in 1nost of those cases, in-
competency was sought to be established largely -on the 
basis of old age and defective men10ry. It is sub1nitted 
that in the case at bar, the evidence is entirely different. 
The testimony of Jimenez himself, together with that of 
the doctor who attended hun, and his friend, Mrs. Loy, 
who· visited him frequently and regularly during his 
confinement in the hospital, shows that Jimenez was suf-
fering from marked and serious mental aberration; and 
that he was under hallucinations and confused impres-
sions, an as a result of the injuries sustained by him 
in the automobile collision. 
It may be further said of the cases cited by the appel-
lant that most of them were ·equity cases and hence sub-
ject to review on the facts as well as on the law by the 
reviewing court. There is no question in this case that 
the action was at law; and the verdict, being supported 
by credible evidence, must be sustained, even though the 
court might come to a different conclusion on the facts. 
We invite the court's attention to the fact that the 
jury was very thoroughly and adequately instructed that 
the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and by evidence which 
was clear, convincing, and unequivocal that plaintiff 
lacked suficient menta[ capacity at the time both releases 
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were signed. See instructions Numbers 4-10, inclusive. 
The jury was also very thoroughly instructed as to the 
natur.e of mental incapacity which would invalidate the 
releases. All of instructions Numbers 4-10 were very 
favorable to the defendant and presented defendant's 
theory to the jury in the best possible light. Particular 
attention is invited to the first paragraph of Instruction 
Number 7, which reads as follows: 
''To avoid a release from liability for per-
sonal injuries, the plaintiff in this case, Jess 
Jimenez, has the burden, of proving, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the invalidity of each 
release ·by clear and unequivocal and convincing 
evidence ; otherwise the releases and settlement 
are binding upon plaintiff and constitutes a com-
plete defense.'' 
The evidence in this case is sufficient to support the 
finding of the jury and the judgment of the trial court 
should not be disturbed. 
POINT II. 
THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT RE-
TURN TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY, NOR 
TENDER TO.THE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE 
AMOUNT OF MONEY RECEIVED IN SETTLEMENT 
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A RATIFICATION OF 
THE RELEASE. 
The modern view as enunciated in the better rea-
soned cases is to the effect that a p~aintiff who has exe-
cuted a release of all claims need not return nor tender 
return of the moneys received by him when a release is 
void or voidable. ·To support their position appellants 
have resurrected from the musty tomes of the dead past, 
two ancient decisions which apparently support the posi-
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tion contended for by then1. The modern cases support 
the view that a plaintiff need not return moneys received 
by him. It is sufficient that any amount which he has 
received be deducted from the judgment. The- modern 
view is well stated in A tchi8on, T o1peka & S anJta Fe Rail-
ro·ad Company vs. Peterson. (Ariz.) 271 Pac. 406·: 
'• It is claimed, further, that a return of the 
$1,000 paid for the release, or a tender thereof, 
was a condition precedent to appeHee's right to 
bring the action, and that, inasmuch as this was 
not done, the cause cannot be maintained. There 
is, it is true, a difference in the decisions on this 
proposition; but the weight of authority, as well 
as the better reasoning~ is that, where the release 
was secured through fraud, repayment of the 
consideration therefor, or a tender thereof, is 
not a requisite to the maintenance of the action. 
Some of the decisions base their ruling upon the 
ground that it would be useless to require a tender 
where it would be refused, as in the case of the 
releasee who claims that the release is valid, while 
others place it upon the ground that the restora-
tion of that which one is entitled to retain in any 
event, either as a result of the agreement sought 
to be set aside or of the original liability, is never 
required. Both of these grounds are app1icable 
here, for the reason that appellant insists that the 
release given by appellee is valid, and the court 
gave it credit on the judgment ror the $1,000 paid 
therefor.'' 
The same view is followed in the later Arizona case 
of Southern Pacific Oo~. v. Gastelum, 283 Pac. 719. The 
Aiizona case was also fdllowed in Estes v. Magee (Idaho) 
109 P. 2d 631, where the court said: 
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''Where, as in this case, the party rescinding 
would be entitled to retain the money received 
even though the settlement agreement be set 
aside, the law does not require the return of the 
money paid in settlement, since the same result 
can be accomplished h~, crediting the amount paid 
in partial satisfaction of the judgment.'' 
To the same effect see K enned;y v. Raby, 
(Okla.) 50 P. 2d 716; Farmers Bank & Trust 
Cmnpany v. Public Service Company of Indiana, 
13 Fed. Supp. 548; Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d 
-±69, 144 P. 2d 349; Thorne v. Co1umbia Cab Co., 
3 N.Y.S. 2d 537. The same view has been followed 
by the Utah Court. Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 
192 Pac. 624; McLaughlin v. Chief Consol. ~fining 
Co., 62 Utah 532, 220 Pac. 726. 
In this case the defendant relies on the releases exe-
cuted by the plaintiff and insisted and still insists that 
said releases are valid. It is apparent that any tender 
of repayment by the plaintiff would have been rejected 
and the law will not require a useless act. Moreover, 
plaintiff was entitled in any event to the amount which 
he had received under the terms of the release, and there 
was no reason for him to make a tender back. Defend-
ant's insurance carrier has not been prejudiced since the 
amount paid at the time the releases were signed was 
deducted from the amount of the verdict. 
POINT III. 
THE rCOURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
THE VARIOUS MEDICAL EXPERTS WHO TESTI-
FIED ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF TO GIVE 
THEIR EXPERT OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR 
NOT THE PLAINTIF WAS MENTALLY SOUND AT 
THE TIME THE RELEASES WERE EXECUTED. 
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Under this point we shaU discuss the issue reached 
by our cross-assignments of error. It is with the ut-
most reluctance that we treat this point at all. We are 
convinced that the position maintained by us under Point 
I and Point II is correct. And if the court rules as w~ 
contend it should under Points I and II, there is no 
need to consider Point III. However, in order to fully 
protect the rights of the plaintiff in this case, we feel 
that it is our duty to bring this issue to the attention of 
the court. We hope that our doing so will not be con-
str-ued as a confession of weakness of our position on 
the merits of Points I and II. 
It is, of course, a general rule that a witness may not 
give his conclusion as to the ultimate fact to be found by 
the jury. However, there is a well recognized exception 
to this rule in the case of experts, partimrlarly medical 
experts. The doctors who testified for the plaintiff in 
this case would have testified, if permitted by the court, 
that the plaintiff was at the time the r~eleases were exe-
cuted, mentally unsound and that he did not have suffi-
cient capacity to enter into, or understand the nature 
of the transaction into which he was entering. 
In Callaham v. Feldman (Colo.), 11 P. 2d 217, a psy-
chiatrist was permitted to base opinions that the testator 
was sane upon all evidence adduced at trial. To the 
same effect see In Re Swam/s Estate, (Utah), 170 Pac. 
452. 
In w,ooten v. DTagon Consol. Milnilng Co., (Utah) 181 
Pac. 593, it was held that an expert's opinion as to the 
fact in issue was not an invasion of the jury's province. 
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In Hellamd v. Bridenstine (Wash.), 104 Pac. 6'26, it 
was held that the fact that a hypothetical question asked 
of a medical expert witness embodied the very fact that 
was ultimately to be found by the jury, did not render 
the question incompetent. In the case at bar there is no 
dispute as to the qualifications of the medical experts. 
The necessary foundation for the questions was laid and 
the hypothetical questions stated were based upon facts 
in evidence at the trial. Nevertheless, the trial court re-
fused to permit the witnesses to answer, and by so rul-
ing, the trial court committed error prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. 
In the event that the court should ho~d that the evi-
dence admitted was insufficient to support a finding of 
mental incompetence on the part of the plaintiff at the 
time the releas·es were executed, then at least the plain-
tiff should have the opportunity for a new trial and the 
opportunity to have presented to the jury the expert 
opinions of the doctors. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing argument w.e conclude: 
1. That the question of whether or not plaintiff 
was competent at the time the releases were executed 
was a question of fact for the jury, and there is suf-
ficient evidence in the record to support a finding that 
the plaintiff was mentally incompetent at the time the 
releases were executed. 
2. The fact that the plaintiff did not return to the 
insurance company the amount of money paid in con-
sideration of the exe_cution of the releases did not amount 
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to a ratification of the release. Plaintiff was under no 
obligation to make tender of the n1oney back, and the 
rights of the insurance company wer·e adequately pro-
tected by deduction from the verdict of the amount paid 
by the insurance company. 
There being no errors of law prejudicial to the de-
fendant, the judgm·ent of the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
3. If, however, the court should be of the opinion 
that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of 
mental incapacity on the part o£ the plaintiff at the 
time the releases were executed, then a new trial should 
be granted with directions to the trial court to permit 
medical experts, properly qualified, to testify as to their 
opinion of the p~aintiff's mentai capacity or incapacity 
at the time the releases were executed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, CALLISTE·R, & LEWIS, 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN, of cownsel 
.A.tto·rneys fo'r Plairntiff a.nd 
Respond,ent, Jess Jimenez. 
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